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Abstract
The reasoning behind uses of confidence intervals and p-values in scientific prac-
tice may be made coherent by modeling the inferring statistician or scientist as
an idealized intelligent agent. With other things equal, such an agent regards a
hypothesis coinciding with a confidence interval of a higher confidence level as
more certain than a hypothesis coinciding with a confidence interval of a lower
confidence level. The agent uses different methods of confidence intervals con-
ditional on what information is available. The coherence requirement means all
levels of certainty of hypotheses about the parameter agree with the same distribu-
tion of certainty over parameter space. The result is a unique and coherent fiducial
distribution that encodes the post-data certainty levels of the agent.
While many coherent fiducial distributions coincide with confidence distributions
or Bayesian posterior distributions, there is a general class of coherent fiducial
distributions that equates the two-sided p-value with the probability that the null
hypothesis is true. The use of that class leads to point estimators and interval
estimators that can be derived neither from the dominant frequentist theory nor
from Bayesian theories that rule out data-dependent priors. These simple estima-
tors shrink toward the parameter value of the null hypothesis without relying on
asymptotics or on prior distributions.
A prior-free framework of coherent inference and its
derivation of simple shrinkage estimators
June 28, 2012
David R. Bickel
Ottawa Institute of Systems Biology
Department of Biochemistry, Microbiology, and Immunology
Department of Mathematics and Statistics
University of Ottawa; 451 Smyth Road; Ottawa, Ontario, K1H 8M5
Abstract
The reasoning behind uses of conﬁdence intervals and p-values in scientiﬁc practice
may be made coherent by modeling the inferring statistician or scientist as an idealized
intelligent agent. With other things equal, such an agent regards a hypothesis coin-
ciding with a conﬁdence interval of a higher conﬁdence level as more certain than a
hypothesis coinciding with a conﬁdence interval of a lower conﬁdence level. The agent
uses diﬀerent methods of conﬁdence intervals conditional on what information is avail-
able. The coherence requirement means all levels of certainty of hypotheses about the
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parameter agree with the same distribution of certainty over parameter space. The re-
sult is a unique and coherent ﬁducial distribution that encodes the post-data certainty
levels of the agent.
While many coherent ﬁducial distributions coincide with conﬁdence distributions or
Bayesian posterior distributions, there is a general class of coherent ﬁducial distributions
that equates the two-sided p-value with the probability that the null hypothesis is true.
The use of that class leads to point estimators and interval estimators that can be
derived neither from the dominant frequentist theory nor from Bayesian theories that
rule out data-dependent priors. These simple estimators shrink toward the parameter
value of the null hypothesis without relying on asymptotics or on prior distributions.
Keywords: conﬁdence distribution; conﬁdence curve; conﬁdence measure; conﬁdence pos-
terior distribution; ﬁducial inference; large-scale simultaneous inference; multiple hypothesis
testing; multiple comparison procedure; observed conﬁdence level
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1 Introduction
In the years following the oracle that some form of ﬁducial inference may play a pivotal
role in 21st-century statistics (Efron, 1998), there has been an ongoing resurgence of interest
in ﬁducial distributions that generate conﬁdence intervals (e.g., Schweder and Hjort, 2002;
Singh et al., 2005; Polansky, 2007; Singh et al., 2007; Tian et al., 2011; Bityukov et al., 2011;
Kim and Lindsay, 2011; Bickel, 2011b, 2012b) and in ﬁducial distributions more generally
(e.g., Hannig et al., 2006; Hannig, 2009; Xiong and Mu, 2009; Gibson et al., 2011; Wang
et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2012). Fiducial inference initially promised an objective alternative
to Bayesianism as a form of inductive reasoning (Fisher, 1973) but has historically suﬀered
from problems of understanding the meaning of ﬁducial probability and from the ability to
derive conﬂicting ﬁducial probabilities from the same family of sampling distributions (see
Wilkinson, 1977). This paper addresses both diﬃculties by interpreting ﬁducial probability
in terms of the theories of coherent decision making that also undergird Bayesian inference.
The main thesis is that many of the usual applications of conﬁdence intervals in sci-
ence lead to reasonable inferences that can be improved by enforcing self-consistency in the
technical sense of probabilistic coherence, which does not in itself require Bayesian posterior
distributions (Hacking, 1967; Goldstein, 1997; Bickel, 2012a). Using a conﬁdence interval
procedure is reasonable when the conﬁdence level of the interval estimate computed using
the observed data is at least approximately monotonic with the degree of certainty or level
of belief that the statistician has in saying the true value of the parameter lies in the interval
(Cox, 1958). In other words, higher conﬁdence levels correspond to higher subjective lev-
els of certainty of the statistician adopting the conﬁdence procedure; otherwise, a diﬀerent
procedure should be adopted in the absence of other considerations. If consistent with one
3
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another, the certainty levels of that statistician can be encoded as a probability distribu-
tion on parameter space known as a conﬁdence distribution. If the same statistician would
reasonably and self-consistently use another conﬁdence procedure for another parameter in
the data analysis, the levels of certainty of the ﬁrst parameter can still be represented as
a probability distribution, this time a ﬁducial distribution that need not be a conﬁdence
distribution. The situation described here is abstracted by replacing the actual statistician
with an artiﬁcially intelligent agent that either approximates the certainty levels of the ac-
tual decision-makers or that serves to derive the hypothetical consequences of adopting its
ﬁducial distributions for statistical inference.
The metaphor of a decision-making agent that has a unique ﬁducial distribution for
any data set leads to coherent hypothesis tests, point estimates, and interval estimates
without the requirement of eliciting the actual levels of belief of any human agent. Since the
coherent agent is fully determined by choices of conﬁdence interval and hypothesis testing
procedures, the subjectivity involved is no greater than that already present in frequentist
inference. While some likelihoodists have criticized frequentism for even that subjectivity
(Royall, 1997, 3.7), the subjectivity involved in selecting the rejection region for signiﬁcance
testing coheres with post-positivistic philosophies of science that frankly acknowledge that
scientiﬁc inference is not a matter of following an algorithm (Polanyi, 1962, 3.1).
Section 2 provides preliminary concepts and propositions, demonstrating that interpret-
ing conﬁdence levels as certainty levels or hypothetical levels of belief leads either to non-
coherent estimates and hypothesis testing or to inference on the basis of a conﬁdence distribu-
tion of the parameter as if it were a Bayesian posterior distribution. Iterating that reasoning
along the lines of Fisher's ﬁducial argument for multiple parameters leads to merging con-
ﬁdence distributions into a parameter distribution that is coherent in the sense that it is a
4
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probability measure. This is ﬁducial inference in the sense that it is a modern development
of ﬁducial reasoning but without the often impractical requirements involving aspects of
conditional inference and without violating the rules of ordinary probability theory, that of
the Kolmogorov axioms. The framework proposed in Section 2 also diﬀers from Fisher's in
its incorporation of nested conﬁdence sets of vector parameters. Thus, the proposed frame-
work for inference is presented as a realization of the core ideas behind the original ﬁducial
argument, Neyman-Pearson conﬁdence intervals, and theories of coherent decision-making
that prescribe minimizing expected loss with respect to a posterior distribution (e.g., von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953; Savage, 1954). (Following the usage in Dempster (2008),
Eaton and Sudderth (2010), and Bickel (2012a), the term posterior herein means data-
dependent and thus includes but is not limited to a Bayesian posterior relative to some
prior.)
Section 3 demonstrates that the resulting framework of ﬁducial inference can lead to
shrinkage in point and interval estimates toward a null hypothesis value in a way that is
not possible in the pure frequentist and pure Bayesian approaches. For example, Figure 1
displays the shrunken parameter estimate as an alternative to the usual frequentist estimate
computed after testing the null hypothesis. Given the two-sided p-value PV, the maximum-
likelihood estimate θˆ is simply shrunk to (1− PV) θˆ. That value would only be available from
Bayes's theorem if the prior depended on the sample size such that the posterior probability
of the null hypothesis were equal to PV.
Lastly, remarks elaborating on technical points appear in Section 4, a brief discussion on
equating p-values with ﬁducial probabilities in Section 5, and longer proofs in Appendix A.
5
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Figure 1: Estimates of the normal mean relative to its standard error as a function of the
observed number of standard errors from 0, the null hypothesis value. The black curve is
the posterior mean with respect to the ﬁducial distribution, and the gray line is the MLE,
plotted as a solid line wherever the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance level
and as a dashed line elsewhere. See Example 8 for details.
6
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2 Fiducial distributions
The concept of a ﬁducial distribution will be introduced in order to ground coherent decision
making in the procedure of conﬁdence intervals or more general conﬁdence sets. In this
way, the coherence condition will be supplemented with a conﬁdence-based condition in
order to prescribe point estimates, interval estimates, hypothesis tests, and other actions
that minimize expected loss. The various types of ﬁducial distributions are formulated as
frequentist posteriors: the basic ﬁducial distribution is deﬁned in Section 2.1, and other
ﬁducial distributions are deﬁned in Section 2.2.
2.1 Basic ﬁducial distributions
2.1.1 Fiducial probability as coherent conﬁdence
The basic parameter θ and nonbasic parameter γ are in the parameter sets denoted by
Θ and Γ, respectively. The distinction between the basic and nonbasic parameters will
become clear shortly. For now, it is enough to note that which parameter is basic cannot
be a function of which parameter happens to be of interest provided that the background
(pre-data) knowledge of the hypothetical agent is ﬁxed (Remark 1).
The observed n-tuple x is a member of X , where X ⊆ Rn. Let B (X ) denote the σ-ﬁeld
of Borel subsets of X . The family of distributions of the random variable X of outcome x
is {Pθ,γ : θ ∈ Θ, γ ∈ Γ}, where each Pθ,γ is deﬁned on the measurable space (X ,B (X )). The
set of all closed interval subsets of [0, 1] will be denoted by I. Herein, ⊂ (as opposed to
⊆) means is a proper subset of. A function Θ̂ = Θ̂• (•) on X × I is a procedure of nested
conﬁdence sets for θ if there is a function p = p• (•) : X × Θ → [0, 1], such that, for any
7
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I ∈ I,
Θ̂x (I) = {θ ∈ Θ : px (θ) ∈ I} (1)
for all x ∈ X and such that the corresponding nested conﬁdence set estimator Θ̂• (I) on X
satisﬁes
Pθ,γ
(
θ ∈ Θ̂X (I)
)
= |I| (2)
for all θ ∈ Θ and γ ∈ Γ, where |•| is the Lebesgue measure. (Since I is an interval in this
case, |I| is the width of I.) As a result, |I| is called the conﬁdence level of Θ̂• (I), and p is
called the conﬁdence curve of Θ̂ (Birnbaum, 1961; Blaker, 2000).
Lemma 1. If Θ̂ is the procedure of nested conﬁdence sets for θ that is deﬁned by some
conﬁdence curve p, then pX (θ) is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 (pX (θ) ∼ U (0, 1))
for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. By the deﬁnitions of a conﬁdence level and a procedure of nested conﬁdence sets,
formulas (1)-(2) yield
Pθ,γ (pX (θ) ∈ I) = |I| (3)
for all I ∈ I, θ ∈ Θ, and γ ∈ Γ. Thus, using I = [α, 1] for any α ∈ [0, 1],
Pθ,γ (pX (θ) ≥ α) = Pθ,γ (pX (θ) ∈ [α, 1]) = 1− α.
Lemma 1 implies that px (θ0) is the observed p-value for testing the null hypothesis that
θ = θ0 against alternative hypothesis that pX (θ0) is stochastically less than U (0, 1). For
that reason, px (•) has usually been called a p-value function or a signiﬁcance function in
8
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the case of a scalar basic parameter (Θ ⊆ R1) (e.g., Fraser, 1991).
Conﬁdence sets used in practice are typically interpreted such that the conﬁdence levels
have the same order as the levels of certainty a statistician or scientist would place on the
hypotheses that the parameter value is within the conﬁdence sets. To state this formally for
a procedure Θ̂ of nested set estimators, let Hx
(
Θ̂
)
denote the set of nested conﬁdence sets
corresponding to x ∈ X :
Hx
(
Θ̂
)
=
{
Θ̂x (I) : I ∈ I
}
. (4)
Given any two observations x1, x2 ∈ X and any two parameter subsets Θ1 ∈ Hx1
(
Θ̂
)
and
Θ2 ∈ Hx2
(
Θ̂
)
, the hypothesis that θ ∈ Θ1 is considered no more certain than () the
hypothesis that θ ∈ Θ2 if and only if the highest conﬁdence level corresponding to the
former hypothesis is less than or equal to that corresponding to the latter:
Θ1  Θ2 ⇐⇒ sup
∣∣∣Θ̂−1x1 (Θ1)∣∣∣ ≤ sup ∣∣∣Θ̂−1x2 (Θ2)∣∣∣ . (5)
The parameter θ that deﬁnes those hypotheses is called the basic parameter.
Deﬁnition 1. Let σx denote any σ-ﬁeld such that Hx
(
Θ̂
)
⊂ σx. For any x ∈ X , a proba-
bility measure Cx on (Θ, σx) is a certainty distribution that is compatible with a conﬁdence
procedure Θ̂ and with its conﬁdence curve p if
Cx1 (Θ1) ≤ Cx2 (Θ2) ⇐⇒ Θ1  Θ2 (6)
for all x1, x2 ∈ X ; Θ1 ∈ Hx1
(
Θ̂
)
; Θ2 ∈ Hx2
(
Θ̂
)
.
Other ﬁducial distributions will be deﬁned in Section 2.2.
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Example 1. Consider the spherically normal model:
X ∼ N (ξθ, γ2I) ,
where X is a random column vector of n observable responses, θ ∈ Rd is a column vector of
d < n unknown means, ξ is a n×d design matrix, γ is the unknown standard deviation, and
I is the d × d identity matrix. Thus, x is the ﬁxed column vector of n observed responses.
Let θ̂ (x) and γ̂ (x) denote the maximum likelihood estimates of θ and γ, respectively, and
let Cx be the multivariate t distribution of location d-vector θ̂, scale matrix γ̂
2 (x) ξTξ, and
n−d degrees of freedom. If ϑ is the random variable with distribution Cx, i.e., ϑ ∼ Cx, then
(
ϑ− θ̂ (x)
)T
ξTξ
(
ϑ− θ̂ (x)
)
γ̂2 (x) d
(7)
is Fd,n−d, the random variable distributed as the F -distribution with 〈d, n− d〉 degrees of
freedom (Box and Tiao, 1992, 2.7.2). Let cx denote the probability density function equal to
the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Cx with respect to the Lebesgue measure. If Θ̂x is deﬁned
by the density contours such that Cx
(
ϑ ∈ Θ̂x (I)
)
= |I| and
θ1 /∈ Θ̂x (I) , θ2 ∈ Θ̂x (I) =⇒ cx (θ1) < cx (θ2)
for all I ∈ I, then Θ̂X (I) is a 100 |I|% conﬁdence region in the sense that it satisﬁes formula
(2) (Box and Tiao, 1992, 2.9.0). According to formula (6), Cx is a certainty distribution
that is compatible with Θ̂.N
The procedure of nested set estimators also provides a general concept of a conﬁdence
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distribution.
Deﬁnition 2. For any x ∈ X , a probability measure Kx on (Θ, σx) is a conﬁdence distribu-
tion that is compatible with Θ̂ if, for every Θ1 ∈ Hx
(
Θ̂
)
,
Kx (Θ1) ∈ Kx (Θ1) , (8)
where Kx (Θ1) =
{
|I| : Pθ,γ
(
θ ∈ Θ̂X (I)
)
= |I| , I ∈ I, Θ̂x (I) = Θ1
}
.
The deﬁnition speciﬁed by formula (8) extends the usual conﬁdence distribution of a
scalar parameter deﬁned on the basis of strictly nested conﬁdence intervals (Cox, 1958)
to conﬁdence distributions of higher-dimensional basic parameters deﬁned on the basis of
conﬁdence sets that could have Θ̂x (I1) = Θ̂x (I2) for some I1 6= I2. In the former case, σx
is the Borel ﬁeld over Θ. Polansky (2007), Singh et al. (2007), and Bickel (2011b, 2012a)
present alternative deﬁnitions of conﬁdence distributions of vector basic parameters. The
deﬁnition used here is a slight generalization of the conﬁdence posterior found in Bickel
(2012b, 2.3).
The simplest type of ﬁducial distribution is a special case of a conﬁdence distribution.
Deﬁnition 3. For any x ∈ X , a probability measure Πx on (Θ, σx) is a basic ﬁducial
distribution that is compatible with Θ̂ if, for every Θ1 ∈ Hx
(
Θ̂
)
,
Πx (Θ1) ≥ Pθ,γ
(
θ ∈ Θ̂X (I)
)
(9)
for all I ∈ I such that Θ̂x (I) = Θ1.
Formulas (8) and (9) are related by Πx (Θ1) = supKx (Θ1). In Example 1, Cx is a
basic ﬁducial distribution as well as a certainty distribution. The inequality of formula (9)
11
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essentially follows van Berkum et al. (1996); see also Bickel (2012b,d) and references.
Deﬁnition 3 sheds light on the relationship between the concepts of a certainty distri-
bution and a basic ﬁducial distribution. Every basic ﬁducial distribution is necessarily a
certainty distribution, as is clear from fact that formulas (5) and (9) imply formula (6).
The converse is not necessarily true, but satisfaction of a condition usually met in practice
is suﬃcient for a certainty distribution Cx to be a basic ﬁducial distribution. The conﬁdence
procedure Θ̂ is said to be potentially invertible if, for any  > 0, there are an x ∈ X and a
Ix ⊆ I that satisfy
|∪I∈IxI| ≥ 1−  (10)
such that the function Θ˜x (•) : Ix → Θx is invertible (bijective) for some Θx ⊆ Θ, where
Θ˜x (I) = Θ̂x (I) for all I ∈ Ix. The condition is trivially met when, as in Example 1, Θ̂x
is bijective for all x ∈ X , since in that case |∪I∈IxI| = 1 in formula (10) with Ix = I
and Θ˜x = Θ̂x for all x ∈ X and I ∈ I. The next example illustrates this non-trivial but
commonly applicable result:
Theorem 1. With Θ as any interval such that sup Θ = ∞, let Θ̂ be a procedure of nested
conﬁdence intervals for θ ∈ R that is deﬁned by some conﬁdence curve p. If px (•) is a
strictly increasing and continuous function such that limθ→∞ px (θ) = 1 for all x ∈ X , then
Θ̂ is potentially invertible.
Proof. By Lemma 1, pX (θ) ∼ U (0, 1) for all θ ∈ Θ. It follows that, for any  > 0, there
is an x ∈ X such that limθ→inf Θ px (θ) < . For any such  and x, let Ix denote the set
of all closed interval subsets of [, 1]. Since |∪I∈IxI| = 1 − , inequality (10) clearly holds.
The invertibility of Θ˜x (•) is a consequence of the stated assumption that px (•) is strictly
increasing and continuous.
12
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Example 2. The observable vector X consists of n independent random variables of distri-
bution N (µ, σ2) with µ and σ unknown. Let υ (•) : X × R→ [0,∞[ and τ (•) : X × R→ R
denote the functions such that
υ (x;µ) = τ 2 (x;µ) ;
τ (x;µ) =
µˆ (x)− µ
σˆ (x) /
√
n
,
which is the observed Student t statistic with µ as the null hypothesis value, for any x ∈ X .
If the basic parameter is θ = µ2, then the nonbasic parameter is the pair γ = (µ/ |µ| , σ), and
τ (X;µ) is a pivotal quantity with the Student t distribution of n − 1 degrees of freedom,
implying that υ (X;µ) = F1,n−1. (The ratio µ/ |µ| is the sign of µ.) A conﬁdence procedure
Θ̂ can then be constructed by deﬁning the conﬁdence curve p according to the upper-tailed
p-value
px (θ) = Pθ,γ (υ (X; 0) ≥ υ (x; 0)) (11)
for all x ∈ X , θ ≥ 0, and γ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} × ]0,∞[. Because Θ = [0,∞[ and because formula
(11) implies that px (•) is strictly increasing and continuous for all x ∈ X , the conditions of
Theorem 1 are met even though Θ̂X (•) is almost surely not invertible.N
Theorem 2. Let Θ̂ be a procedure of nested conﬁdence sets for θ that is deﬁned by some
conﬁdence curve p. If Θ̂ is potentially invertible, then every certainty distribution compatible
with Θ̂ is also a basic ﬁducial distribution that is compatible with Θ̂.
2.1.2 P-values as hypothesis probabilities
The next result provides suﬃcient conditions for equating the certainty level of a simple
(point) null hypothesis with a p-value.
13
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Corollary 1. Let Θ̂ be a procedure of nested conﬁdence intervals for θ that is deﬁned by
some conﬁdence curve p. Under the conditions of Theorem 2, every certainty distribution
Cx compatible with Θ̂ is also a basic ﬁducial distribution that is compatible with Θ̂ and, if
Θ = [θ0,∞[ for some θ0 ∈ R, then, for all x ∈ X ,
Cx (ϑ = θ0) = px (θ) , (12)
where ϑ ∼ Cx, i.e., ϑ is the random variable of distribution Cx.
Example 3. Example 2, continued. Since the conditions of Corollary 1 are satisﬁed, the
certainty level of the hypothesis that the parameter value equals zero is equal to the p-value
of the test with θ = 0 as the null hypothesis:
Cx (ϑ = 0) = px (0) = P0,γ (υ (X; 0) ≥ υ (x; 0)) (13)
for all x ∈ X and γ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} × ]0,∞[. That is simply the usual two-sided p-value from
the single-sample t-test, as equation (11) makes clear. N
In conclusion, since Bayesian posterior probabilities are typically not equal to two-sided
p-values, Corollary 1 prevents certainty theory from being regarded as a special case of
Bayesian theory (5).
Some operating characteristics of testing hypotheses under the equality of the p-value and
the certainty level appear in the remainder of this subsection. They do not in themselves
warrant the use of the ﬁducial distribution but rather report some of its repeated-sampling
properties. Here, δi,j is Kronecker's delta: δθ0,θ0 = 1 and δθ,θ0 = 0 for θ 6= θ0.
Theorem 3. Consider the null hypothesis that θ = θ0 for some θ0 ∈ Θ. For a Type I error
14
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cost `I > 0 and a Type II error cost `II > 0, the loss function L : Θ× {0, 1} → {0, `I, `II} is
deﬁned by L (θ, 0) = (1− δθ,θ0) `II and L (θ, 1) = δθ,θ0`I. If the action a (x) ∈ {0, 1} is chosen
to minimize expected loss with respect to a certainty distribution Cx that is compatible with
a conﬁdence curve p and that meets the criteria of Corollary 1 for all x ∈ X , then
a (x) =

1 if px (θ0) < α (`)
0 if px (θ0) > α (`) ,
(14)
where ` = `I/`II, and α (`) = (1 + `)
−1 is the Type I error rate of a (X).
Proof. It is known that some algebra leads to
a (x) = arg min
b=0,1
∫
L (θ, b) dΠx (θ) =

1 if Cx (ϑ = θ0) < α (`)
0 if Cx (ϑ = θ0) > α (`)
for any parameter distribution Πx. Corollary 1 implies that Cx (ϑ = θ0) = px (θ0), which
leads to equation (14) by substitution. Because pX (θ0) ∼ U (0, 1) by Lemma 1 under θ = θ0,
the Type I error rate is
Pθ0,γ (a (X) = 1) = Pθ0,γ (pX (θ) < α (`)) = α (`) . (15)
For instance, equation (14) implies that the practice of rejecting the null hypothesis at
the 0.05 signiﬁcance level would be appropriate if ` = 19, i.e., if the cost of a Type I error
were 19 times as much as the cost of a Type II error.
15
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Corollary 2. If θ = θ0 in addition to the assumptions of Theorem 3, then the loss L (θ, a (X))
averaged over the sample space is
∫
L (θ0, a (x)) dPθ0,γ (x) =
`I
1 + `
.
[
` =
`I
`II
]
Proof. By equation (14),
∫
L (θ0, a (x)) dPθ0,γ (x) = Pθ0,γ (a (X) = 0)L (θ, 0) + Pθ0,γ (a (X) = 1)L (θ, 1)
= Pθ0,γ (a (X) = 0) (1− δθ0,θ0) `II + Pθ0,γ (a (X) = 1) δθ0,θ0`I
= 0 + Pθ0,γ (a (X) = 1) `I.
According to equation (15), the ﬁrst factor of the right-hand-side is α (`).
Since the loss function of Theorem 3 may be less applicable when a p-value is reported
as a measure of evidence rather than compared to a ﬁxed signiﬁcance level, quadratic loss
of the p-value as a point estimator of a hypothesis truth value is often considered (Bickel,
2012a). In this context, Hwang et al. (1992) and Morgenthaler and Staudte (2005) ﬁnd
that the p-value is not necessarily admissible under the frequentist decision theory of Wald
(1961). However, the next theorem indicates that the p-value is often optimal according to
theories of minimizing expected loss with respect to the agent's parameter distribution (e.g.,
Savage, 1954). Its repeated-sampling performance under the null hypothesis is quantiﬁed in
the corollary.
Theorem 4. Consider the null hypothesis that θ = θ0 for some θ0 ∈ Θ. The quadratic
loss function L : Θ × [0, 1] → [0, 1] is deﬁned by L
(
θ, δ̂
)
=
(
δ̂ − δθ,θ0
)2
. If the action
δ̂ (x) ∈ [0, 1] is chosen to minimize expected loss with respect to a certainty distribution Cx
16
http://biostats.bepress.com/cobra/art95
that is compatible with a conﬁdence curve p and that meets the criteria of Corollary 1 for all
x ∈ X , then δ̂ (x) = px (θ0).
Proof. A standard result (e.g., Lad, 1996) is that δ̂ (x) = Cx (ϑ = θ0) minimizes expected
quadratic loss for any parameter distribution Cx. Corollary 1 implies that Cx (ϑ = θ0) =
px (θ0).
Corollary 3. If θ = θ0 in addition to the assumptions of Theorem 4, then the loss averaged
over the sample space is ∫
L
(
θ, δ̂ (x)
)
dPθ,γ (x) =
1
3
.
Proof. Theorem 4 gives δ̂ (x) = px (θ0), with the result that
∫
L
(
θ0, δ̂ (x)
)
dPθ0,γ (x) =
∫
(px (θ0)− δθ0,θ0)2 dPθ0,γ (x)
=
∫ (
p2x (θ0)− 2p2x (θ0) + 12
)
dpx (θ0)
= E
(
U2 − 2U + 1) = E (U2)− 2E (U) + 1,
where, by equation Corollary 1, U ∼ U (0, 1). Finally, E (U2) = 1/3 and E (U) = 1/2.
2.2 Other ﬁducial distributions
As above, the distribution of X depends on the value of some full parameter. Let Φ denote
a set of target parameter values, where each target parameter value is a function of the
full parameter value. Hypothesis tests, eﬀect-size estimates, and other actions may depend
on the value of the target parameter. In other words, any potential parameter of interest
is a function of the target parameter. The possible dependence of the distribution of X
on another parameter, called the nontarget parameter, is suppressed for notational economy.
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Suppose there are measurable spaces
(
Φ(1),Σ(1)
)
,
(
Φ(2),Σ(2)
)
and functions •′ : Φ→ Φ(1), •′′ :
Φ→ Φ(2) such that the function φ : Φ→ Φ(1) × Φ(2) is bijective (invertible), where φ (φ) =
(φ′, φ′′) for all φ ∈ Φ. Thus, φ = φ−1 ((φ′, φ′′)) for any φ ∈ Φ, with the interpretation that φ′
and φ′′ are subparameters of φ that together contain all the information in φ. Accordingly,
•′ and •′′ are called subparameter functions.
The general deﬁnition of a ﬁducial distribution is self-referential with the recursion stop-
ping at one or more basic ﬁducial distributions (Deﬁnition 1).
Deﬁnition 4. Consider a ﬁducial distribution Π
(1)
x on
(
Φ(1),Σ(1)
)
and a probability distribu-
tion Π
(2)
x (•|φ′) on
(
Φ(2),Σ(2)
)
for every φ ∈ Φ. Let pi(1)x : Φ(1) → [0,∞[ and pi(2)x (•|φ′) : Φ(2) →
[0,∞[ denote the probability density functions deﬁned in terms of Radon-Nikodym diﬀeren-
tiation of Π
(1)
x and Π
(2)
x (•|φ′) with respect to the same dominating measure. A probability
distribution Πx on a measurable space (Φ,Σ) is called the joint ﬁducial distribution that ex-
tends Π
(1)
x and Π
(2)
x if it corresponds to a probability density function pix : Φ
(1)×Φ(2) → [0,∞[
such that
pix (φ
′, φ′′) = pi(1)x (φ
′) pi(2)x (φ
′′|φ′) (16)
for all φ ∈ Φ and if P(2)x =
{
Π
(2)
x (•|φ′) : φ ∈ Φ
}
satisﬁes these conditions:
1. For all φ ∈ Φ such that φ′′ is a function of φ′, the probability distribution Π(2)x (•|φ′) is
∆φ′′ , the Dirac measure with support at φ
′′ (probability distribution concentrated at
φ′′).
2. Let Φ? denote the set of all φ ∈ Φ such that φ′′ is not a function of φ′. At least one of
the following statements holds:
(a) Consider the function φ(1) : Φ(2) → Φ(1) that satisﬁes φ(1) (φ′′) = φ′ for each
18
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φ ∈ Φ?. For all φ ∈ Φ?, the conditional ﬁducial distribution given φ′ is deﬁned by
Π(2)x (•|φ′) = Π(2)x
(•|φ(1) (ϕ(2)) = φ′) , (17)
which is the conditional probability distribution of ϕ(2) given φ(1)
(
ϕ(2)
)
= φ′,
where ϕ(2) is the random variable distributed as some ﬁducial distribution Π
(2)
x .
(b) For all φ ∈ Φ?, Π(2)x (•|φ′) is a ﬁducial distribution. In this case, the probability
distribution
Π(2)x = Π
(2)
x (•) =
∫
Π(2)x (•|φ′) dΠ(1)x (φ′) (18)
is called the marginal ﬁducial distribution with respect to Π
(1)
x and P(2)x .
Any parameter distribution is a ﬁducial distribution if it is a probability distribution that
can be deduced from a basic ﬁducial distribution or a joint ﬁducial distribution. N
According to the deﬁnition and Kolmogorov probability theory, any distribution of a
parameter is a ﬁducial distribution if it is a basic ﬁducial distribution, a conditional ﬁducial
distribution, a marginal ﬁducial distribution, or a joint ﬁducial distribution. While basic
ﬁducial distributions are necessarily conﬁdence distributions, other ﬁducial distributions are
often not conﬁdence distributions.
The joint ﬁducial distributions of Examples 4 and 5 are well-known posterior distributions
derived by Fisher via his ﬁducial argument and by Jeﬀreys via improper priors (Jeﬀreys,
1998, 7.1). Speciﬁc instances of ﬁducial distributions that have no Bayesian counterpart
are introduced for the ﬁrst time in Section 3.
Example 4. As in Example 2, the observable vector X consists of n independent random
variables of distribution Pθ,σ = N (θ, σ
2) with θ and σ unknown. With the parameterization
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φ = (θ, σ2), deﬁne the subparameter functions such that φ′ = σ2 and φ′′ = θ for all φ ∈
R× ]0,∞[. Let υ (•) : X × ]0,∞[→ ]0,∞[ and τ (•) : X ×R× ]0,∞[→ R denote the pivot
functions such that
υ (x;σ) =
(n− 1) σˆ2 (x)
σ2
; τ (x; θ, σ) =
θˆ (x)− θ
σ/
√
n
for all x ∈ X , θ ∈ R, and σ ∈ ]0,∞[, where θˆ (x) and σˆ2 (x) are the usual estimates of the
mean and variance. Since υ (X;σ) has a χ2 distribution with n − 1 degrees of freedom for
all σ ∈ ]0,∞[, there is a random variable ς2 of basic ﬁducial distribution Π(1)x such that
Π(1)x (ς ≤ σ) = Pθ,σ (υ (X; 1) ≥ υ (x; 1))
for all x ∈ X , θ ∈ R, and σ ∈ ]0,∞[. Likewise, since τ (X; θ, σ) has a standard normal
distribution for all θ ∈ R and σ ∈ ]0,∞[, there is a random variable ϑ (σ2) of basic ﬁducial
distribution Π
(2)
x (•|σ2) such that
Π(2)x
(
ϑ
(
σ2
) ≤ θ|σ2) = Pθ,σ (τ (X; 0, σ) ≥ τ (x; 0, σ))
for all x ∈ X , θ ∈ R, and σ ∈ ]0,∞[. The distribution Πx of the resulting random variable
ϕ = (ϑ (ς2) , ς2) is the joint ﬁducial distribution according to equation (16). With θ as the
parameter of interest, Yates (1939) eliminated the nuisance parameter σ by integration with
respect to Π
(1)
x , ﬁnding that the posterior mean ϕ′′ = ϑ¯ =
∫
ϑ (s2) dΠ
(1)
x (s2) is distributed
such that
(
ϑ¯− θˆ (x)
)√
n/sˆ (x) has the Student t distribution with n−1 degrees of freedom.
That marginal ﬁducial distribution is also the conﬁdence distribution for θ that corresponds
to τ (X; θ, σ (X)) as the pivotal quantity (Wilkinson, 1977). N
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In that example, the ﬁducial distribution of the parameter of interest is a conﬁdence
distribution. That is not always the case, as the next example makes clear.
Example 5. For samples of sizes n1 and n2 from two diﬀerent normal populations of un-
known means (θ1, θ2) and variances (σ
2
1, σ
2
2), the ni-tuple Xi = (Xi,1, . . . , Xi,n1) has indepen-
dently distributed components Xi,j ∼ N (µi, σ2i ) for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, . . . , ni. The parameter
of interest is the diﬀerence in means, θ = θ1− θ2. As seen in Example 4, marginal inferences
may be made about θi on the basis of the random parameter ϑ¯i, distributed according to
the marginal ﬁducial distribution such that
(
ϑ¯i − θˆi (x)
)√
ni/sˆi (x) has the Student t dis-
tribution with n− 1 degrees of freedom for i = 1, 2, where θˆi (x) and sˆi (x) are the observed
estimates of the mean and variance for the ith sample. Let φ = (φ′, φ′′) = (θ1, θ2), let C ′
denote the ﬁducial distribution of ϑ¯1, and let Π
(2)
x (•|φ′) denote the ﬁducial distribution of
ϑ¯2 for all θ1 ∈ R. Since marginalization according to equation (16) implies that ϑ¯1 and ϑ¯2
are independent, the marginal ﬁducial distribution of ϑ = ϑ¯1 − ϑ¯2 is the Behrens-Fisher
ﬁducial distribution of the diﬀerence in means (Fisher, 1935). As has often been pointed
out, that ﬁducial distribution does not lead to exact conﬁdence intervals; thus, the ﬁducial
distribution of ϑ is not a conﬁdence distribution. N
Because a sampling model and data set do not lead to a unique ﬁducial distribution,
it is useful at this point to formalize the concept of a hypothetical intelligent agent that
ultimately bases its decisions on conﬁdence intervals. Let P denote the set of all ﬁducial
distributions on (Φ,Σ) that can be constructed with X as the data space. A ﬁducial agent
(FA) is a function Π : X → P such that its basic ﬁducial distributions are derived from the
same procedures of nested conﬁdence sets and such that its joint ﬁducial distributions are
related to its other ﬁducial distributions by equation (16) for the same measurable spaces
and subparameter functions (•′ and •′′). Thus, the ﬁducial distribution of any FA Π and
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observation x ∈ X is uniquely speciﬁed by Π (x), which is denoted by Πx above. Likewise, a
Bayesian posterior is uniquely speciﬁed by the prior and family of sampling distributions that
represent the beliefs of a Bayesian agent. This correspondence between ﬁducial or Bayesian
agents and ﬁducial or Bayesian posteriors adds formal support to the claim of Fraser (2008)
and Hannig (2009) that Bayesian inference faces essentially the same uniqueness problem as
ﬁducial inference. Unique ﬁducial distributions can alternatively be derived under certain
conditions by considering the conﬁdence procedure as part of the model of the physical
system (Remark 3).
Example 6. Welch (1947) proposed a system of approximate conﬁdence intervals as a solu-
tion to the Behrens-Fisher problem (Example 5). The corresponding approximate conﬁdence
distribution, as an approximate basic ﬁducial distribution, represents the posterior beliefs
of a diﬀerent agent than the agent whose posterior beliefs are represented by the ﬁducial
distribution derived in Example 5. The latter agent is a better idealization of statisticians
who would order the certainty level of hypotheses according to the conﬁdence levels from
the basic ﬁducial distributions of Example 5 when making inferences about the mean as
well as when making inferences about the standard deviation. Such ordering is not coherent
with ordering levels of certainty according to the conﬁdence levels of Welch (1947). This has
far-reaching implications for statistical practice (Remark 1). N
In some cases, the statistician may have diﬃculty in committing to a single FA. When
multiple FAs are equally suitable as representations of the posterior beliefs of a scientist,
organization, or other real agent, the most representative FAs may be coherently combined
into a single posterior distribution via simple arithmetic averaging (see, e.g., Paris, 1994) or
the game-theoretic method of Bickel (2012d). The combined posterior distribution will not
necessarily be a ﬁducial distribution.
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3 Inference in the presence of a plausible null hypothesis
3.1 Certainty based on a plausible null hypothesis
In many applications involving testing the null hypothesis that that φ = φ0 for some φ0 ∈ Φ,
the parameter value φ0 is regarded as a priori more plausible than any other parameter
value, at least for the sake of argument or reporting. That information can be encoded in
joint ﬁducial distributions by using the Dirac measure in place of a basic ﬁducial distribution,
as Deﬁnition 4 allows.
A simple and widely applicable way to do that begins by deﬁning φ′ as a distance from
the most plausible parameter value. In this setting, Φ(1) ⊆ [0,∞[, and the subparameter
functions •′ and •′′ and a magnitude transformation mag satisfy φ′′ = φ and
φ′ = mag (φ) = D (φ, φ0)
for all φ ∈ Φ, where D is a distance measure. Let Π(2)x denote the basic ﬁducial distribution
that is compatible with a procedure of nested conﬁdence sets for φ. By assumption, Π
(2)
x
meets the conditions of Corollary 1. Since mag (φ′′0) = 0 implies that φ0 = φ, Deﬁnition 4
requires that Π
(2)
x (•|0) = ∆φ0 . Let τ (X;φ, γ) be a pivotal quantity that deﬁnes the random
variable ϑ(2) of a basic ﬁducial distribution Π
(2)
x compatible with a conﬁdence curve p(2) by
Π(2)x
(
ϑ(2) ≤ φ0
)
= Pφ,γ (τ (X;φ0, γ) ≥ τ (x;φ0, γ))
for all x ∈ X , φ ∈ Φ\ {φ0}, and γ ∈ Γ, where Γ is the set of possible values of the nontarget
parameter, which in this subsection is required to be nonbasic (2.1). To deﬁne Π
(1)
x , the
parameter φ will be broken into its magnitude component φ′ and direction component, a
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member of
Dφ0 = {φ/φ′ : φ ∈ Φ\ {φ0}} .
Let υ (x;φ′, δ, γ) = |τ (x;φ′δ, γ)| and Pφ′,δ,γ = Pφ′δ,γ for all x ∈ X , φ ∈ Φ\ {φ0}, δ ∈ Dφ0 ,
and γ ∈ Γ. Suppose there is a random variable ϑ(1) of basic ﬁducial distribution Π(1)x,φ0 that
is compatible with a procedure of nested conﬁdence sets for θ(1) that is deﬁned by some
conﬁdence curve p
(1)
•,φ0 . This ﬁducial distribution must satisfy
Π
(1)
x,φ0
(
ϑ(1) ≤ φ′) = p(1)x,φ0 (φ′) = Pφ′,δ,γ (υ (X;φ′, δ, γ) ≥ υ (x;φ′, δ, γ))
for all x ∈ X , φ ∈ Φ\ {φ0}, δ ∈ Dφ0 , and γ ∈ Γ. Since the ﬁducial distribution Π(2)x generates
conditional ﬁducial distributions according to equation (17) for φ ∈ Φ\ {φ0}, there is a joint
ﬁducial distribution that extends Π
(1)
x,φ0
and Π
(2)
x . That distribution is denoted by Cx,φ0 and
is called a ﬁducial distribution in the presence of the plausible null hypothesis that φ = φ0.
Letting ϕ denote the random variable of distribution Cx,φ0 , that ﬁducial distribution is
succinctly expressed as a mixture of ∆φ0 and Π
(2)
x
(•|ϑ(2) 6= φ0):
Cx,φ0 (•) = Cx,φ0 (ϕ = φ0)Cx,φ0 (•|ϕ = φ0) + Cx,φ0 (ϕ 6= φ0)Cx,φ0 (•|ϕ > φ0)
=
Π
(1)
x,φ0
(
ϑ(1) = φ+ (φ0)
)
∆φ0 (•) +
Π
(1)
x,φ0
(
ϑ(1) > φ+ (φ0)
)
Π(2)x
(•|ϑ(2) 6= φ0) (19)
= Π(2)x
(•|ϑ(2) > φ0)+ (∆φ0 (•)− Π(2)x (•|ϑ(2) 6= φ0))Π(1)x,φ0 (ϑ(1) = φ0) .
The certainty level of the plausible null hypothesis is equal to a p-value since Π
(1)
x,φ0
meets
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the conditions of Corollary 1 and since Φ(1) ⊆ [0,∞[. Speciﬁcally,
Cx,φ0 (ϕ = φ0) = Π
(1)
x,φ0
(ϕ = φ0) = p
(1)
x,φ0
(φ′0) . (20)
Simpliﬁcation in the form of
Π(2)x
(•|ϑ(2) 6= φ0) = Π(2)x (•) (21)
(equality up to measure 0) is possible in the case that Π
(2)
x
(
ϑ(2) 6= φ0
)
= 1, as when ϑ(2) ∼
Π
(2)
x is continuous. The next example illustrates this.
Example 7. In the notation of this subsection, equation (13) of Example 3 says Π
(1)
x,0
(
ϑ(1) = 0
)
=
p′x,0 (0) , where p
′
x,0 (0) is the usual two-sided p-value from the single-sample t-test of the
null hypothesis that the mean is equal to 0, i.e., that φ = φ0. Thus, equation (20)
equates that p-value with the posterior level of certainty in that hypothesis: Cx,0 (ϕ = 0) =
p′x,0 (0) . By contrast, the basic ﬁducial distribution Π
(2)
x assigns 0 certainty to the hypothesis(
Π
(2)
x
(
ϑ(2) = 0
)
= 0
)
since it admits a continuous density function: the continuous ran-
dom variable ϑ(2) ∼ Π(2)x is proportional to a noncentral t variate according to expression
(7), in which d = 1 here. Using the same example but with a known variance and in the
multivariate setting (d ≥ 2) of Example 1, Stein (1959) pointed out the discrepancy be-
tween Π
(1)
x,0
(
ϑ(1) ∈ •) and Π(2)x ((ϕ(2))T ϕ(2) ∈ •) and favored the former for inference about
mag (θ) = θTθ since Π
(1)
x,0 corresponds to a conﬁdence procedure for mag (θ); Remark 4 brieﬂy
surveys the literature on this discrepancy. In the context of the prior plausibility of the null
hypothesis value φ0 = 0 (Bickel, 2012b,d), equation (19) indicates that there can be no
conﬂict between the two distributions: Π
(1)
x,0 only pertains to the magnitude of θ, and Π
(2)
x
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only pertains to its direction. By contrast, in the context of no prior plausibility of one value
of φ above any other, Π
(2)
x rather than Cx,0 would be appropriate for the minimization of
expected utility. More formally, Cx,0 and Π
(2)
x correspond to the idealized knowledge bases
of diﬀerent agents, one of which may better represent actual knowledge. N
3.2 Eﬀect-size estimates shrunk toward the null hypothesis
In this subsection, it is assumed that Π
(2)
x
(
ϑ(2) 6= φ0
)
= 1, entailing that equation (21)
holds. The conditions of Corollary 1 are also taken for granted with the result that every
basic ﬁducial distribution considered is a conﬁdence distribution.
3.2.1 Point estimation
An estimator of a parameter is considered consistent if it converges in Pφ,γ-probability to
the true value of the parameter. Similarly, for a scalar parameter (φ ∈ R), the signiﬁcance
function is called asymptotically powerful (cf. Bickel, 2012a) if it converges in probability to
0 or 1 under the alternative hypothesis (φ 6= φ0):
qX (φ0)
Pφ,γ→

1 if φ < φ0
0 if φ > φ0.
(22)
Let •¯x denote the posterior mean of a parameter with respect to its ﬁducial distribution for
any observation x ∈ X ; again, posterior abbreviates data-dependent and is not necessarily
a Bayesian posterior for a data-independent prior. The posterior means of the ϑ(2) and ϕ
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deﬁned in Section 3.1 are their expectation values with respect to their ﬁducial distributions:
ϑ¯(2)x =
∫
φdΠ(2)x
(
φ
)
; (23)
ϕ¯x =
∫
φdΠx
(
φ
)
= p
(1)
x,φ0
(φ′0)φ0 +
(
1− p(1)x,φ0 (φ′0)
)
ϑ¯(2)x , (24)
where φ ∈ Φ is the dummy variable of integration. Setting φ0 = 0 yields the shrunken
parameter estimate advertised in Section 1: ϕ¯x =
(
1− p(1)x,0 (0)
)
ϑ¯
(2)
x , as will be exploited in
Example 8.
Theorem 5. Let Φ = Rd1 for some d1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . }. If Π(2)x
(
ϑ(2) 6= φ0
)
= 1, if the
alternative-conditional posterior mean ϑ¯
(2)
X is a consistent estimator of φ, and if the p-value
p
(1)
X,φ0
(φ0) is asymptotically powerful, then the alternative-marginal posterior mean ϕ¯X is a
consistent estimator of φ.
Proof. First, the result is easily obtained in the case of a true null hypothesis (φ = φ0). Since
ϑ¯
(2)
X
Pφ0,γ→ φ = φ0, equation (24) immediately yields ϕ¯X
Pφ0,γ→ φ0. Next, consider the case of a
true alternative hypothesis (φ 6= φ0). According to equation (24), for any  > 0,
lim
n→∞
Pφ,γ
(∣∣∣ϕ¯X − ϑ¯(2)X ∣∣∣ < ) = limn→∞Pφ,γ (∣∣∣p(1)X,φ0 (φ′0)(φ0 − ϑ¯(2)X )∣∣∣ < )
= lim
n→∞
Pφ,γ
∣∣∣ϑ¯(2)X − φ0∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣p(1)X,φ0 (φ′0)∣∣∣
 ,
which is 1 according to equation (23) since ϑ¯
(2)
X
Pφ,γ→ φ by the deﬁnition of consistency and
since
∣∣∣p(1)X,φ0 (φ′0)∣∣∣ by equation (22). Thus, ϕ¯X Pφ,γ→ ϑ¯(2)X . Together, ϑ¯(2)X Pφ,γ→ φ and ϕ¯X Pφ,γ→ ϑ¯(2)X
are suﬃcient for ϕ¯X
Pφ,γ→ φ.
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The result is widely applicable. Indeed, for the special case of a scalar basic parameter
(φ ∈ R), Singh et al. (2007) found that ϑ¯(2)X is a consistent estimator of φ under broad
conditions.
Example 8. Example 7, continued. For n → ∞, Figure 1 compares the posterior mean
based on the ﬁducial distribution to the maximum-likelihood estimate (MLE), which is the
sample mean in this case. The plot illustrates how the ﬁducial distribution provides a
smooth alternative to estimation after testing with respect to a ﬁxed signiﬁcance threshold.
Thus, that practice (Fisher, 1925; Montazeri et al., 2010) may be interpreted as a dirty
approximation to coherent frequentist inference. However, in this case, no approximation is
warranted on computational grounds since the posterior mean is simply ϕ¯x =
(
1− p(1)x,0
)
ϑ¯
(2)
x
according to equation (24), where p
(1)
x,0 (0) is the two-sided p-value and ϑ¯
(2)
x is the sample
mean.
Smooth shrinkage can also be achieved through methods of frequentist model averag-
ing (FMA) aimed at estimating a parameter (Claeskens and Hjort, 2008). With respect
to point estimation, the certainty-distribution approach and FMA have many of the same
advantages over estimation after testing and estimation after model selection, their respec-
tive threshold-dependent counterparts. However, existing FMA methods require asymptotic
approximations that ﬁducial distributions do not, indicating that the latter may be more
reliable for small samples. Nonetheless, ﬁducial distributions can depend nonetheless on
asymptotic conﬁdence intervals when exact conﬁdence intervals are not available. Another
advantage of basing point estimation on a joint ﬁducial distribution is coherence with interval
estimates.
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3.2.2 Interval estimation
Many contexts call for reporting certainty regions, regions that contain the parameter at
some speciﬁed level of certainty. When the target parameter is a scalar (φ ∈ R), the regions
are intervals. In that case, it is convenient to deﬁne the certainty curve as the function
p•,φ0 (•) : X × Φ→ [0, 1] such that
px,φ0 (φ) = Cx,φ0 (ϕ ≤ φ)
for all x ∈ X and φ ∈ Φ, where ϕ ∼ Cx,φ0 . Unlike p(1)•,φ0 and p(2), this p•,φ0 is not a conﬁdence
curve since Cx,φ0 is not a conﬁdence distribution. By equation (19),
px,φ0 (φ) = p
(1)
x,φ0
(φ′0) 1[φ0∞) (φ) +
(
1− p(1)x,φ0 (φ′0)
)
p(2)x (φ) .
Inverting px,φ0 yields, for any β ∈ [0, 1],
p−1x,φ0 (β) =

(
p
(2)
x
)−1(
β
1−p(1)x,φ0(φ
′
0)
)
if β <
(
1− p(1)x,φ0 (φ′0)
)
p
(2)
x (φ0)
φ0 if
(
1− p(1)x,φ0 (φ′0)
)
p(2)x (φ0) ≤ β ≤(
1− p(1)x,φ0 (φ′0)
)
p(2)x (φ0) + p
(1)
x,φ0
(φ′0)(
p
(2)
x
)−1(β−p(1)x,φ0(φ′0)
1−p(1)x,φ0(φ
′
0)
)
if β >
(
1− p(1)x,φ0 (φ′0)
)
p
(2)
x (φ0) + p
(1)
x,φ0
(φ′0)
(25)
The interval
Φ̂x,φ0 (β1, β2) =
[
p−1x,φ0 (β1) , p
−1
x,φ0
(β2)
]
is the (β2 − β1) 100% certainty interval centered at (β1 + β2) /2 in the presence of the plausible
null hypothesis that φ = φ0, where 0 ≤ β1 ≤ β2 ≤ 1.
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It is clear from equation (25) that, for any φ ∈ Φ, those certainty intervals are almost
always shorter than the conﬁdence intervals based on Π
(2)
x . When φ is close to φ0, that
improvement tends to be substantial. Thus, nested conﬁdence intervals successfully generate
interval estimates that smoothly shrink toward the plausible hypothesis value rather than
retaining the frequentist coverage property that is appropriate when such a value is unknown.
Bickel (2012c) derived the equivalent of equation (25) with an estimated or approxi-
mate Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis in place of the p-value p
(1)
x,φ0
(φ′0).
A key diﬀerence from the present approach is the interpretation of the interval estimates.
Whereas the marginal conﬁdence intervals of Bickel (2012c) may be interpreted as an ap-
proximation to the physical distribution of the parameter, that interpretation cannot apply
to the above certainty intervals since p
(1)
x,φ0
(φ′0) is not a Bayesian posterior probability for
any data-independent prior (5).
4 Remarks
Remark 1. Example 6 brings into bold relief the fundamental diﬀerence between the proposed
use of conﬁdence distributions and frequentism as it is usually practiced: there is no FA
that would switch from the one-sample t-test to the Welch t-test merely due to a change
in the parameter of interest. In the ﬁducial distribution approach, inferences for a given
agent cohere with each other regardless of choices of the parameter of interest, whereas
many frequentists would instead follow Cox (2006) in changing the system of conﬁdence
intervals according to the parameter of interest even in the absence of changes in background
information. The objective Bayesian practice of using reference priors that depend on which
parameter is of interest (e.g., Berger, 2009) also sacriﬁces coherence in favor of reducing
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inference to automatic rules (Bickel, 2012e).
Remark 2. The concise term conﬁdence measure (Bickel, 2009) for what is here called
a conﬁdence distribution is less subject to misunderstanding than other terms in the lit-
erature. Many authors call the exact conﬁdence measure a conﬁdence distribution (e.g.,
Efron, 1993; Schweder and Hjort, 2002). By contrast, more recent papers (e.g., Singh et al.,
2005, 2007) use conﬁdence distribution for the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
an exact conﬁdence measure and use asymptotic conﬁdence distribution for the CDF of
any conﬁdence measure. To avoid the confusion generated by those diﬀerent deﬁnitions of
conﬁdence distribution, the term conﬁdence posterior distribution (Bickel, 2011b, 2012a)
has been suggested as a term that emphasizes its use in minimizing posterior expected loss.
Polansky (2007, p. 24) coined observed conﬁdence levels for probabilities associated with
conﬁdence measures.
Remark 3. Since Section 2.2 deﬁnes the ﬁducial distribution in terms of the procedure of
conﬁdence intervals that contains the relevant information is relevant to the knowledge base
of an intelligent agent, it does not extend the statistical model of the physical system.
That model remains the family of distributions, which is insuﬃcient to specify a ﬁducial
distribution. However, the basic ﬁducial distribution has much in common with extended
models, including the structural models of Fraser (1968) and the pivotal models of Barnard
(1980) and Barnard (1995) (with Barnard (1996)). While a structural model is deﬁned by
adding a transformation group to the family of distributions, and a pivotal model is deﬁned
by adding a pivot to the family, the two are isomorphic under general conditions (Fraser,
1996). See also McCullagh (2002) and Helland (2004, 2009) for closely related extensions of
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the physical model. These considerations may play a role in discriminating between agents
and their corresponding ﬁducial distributions (Remark 4). In contrast with both ﬁducial
distributions and extended physical models, Fisher did not intend the ﬁducial argument to
depend on any assumptions in addition to the family of distributions (Dawid and Stone,
1982, comment by Fraser) except for the assumption that any physical prior distribution
(5) is unknown (Fisher, 1973).
Remark 4. Previous work related to selecting a ﬁducial distribution according to the available
background information is expressed here in the notation of Example 7. Wilkinson (1977)
found the nonzero probabilities of the null hypothesis provided by Π
(1)
x,0 appropriate when
the null hypothesis has plausibility apart from xi. By contrast, he found the 0 probability of
the null hypothesis provided by Π
(2)
x appropriate in the absence of any pre-data information
about φ. Wilkinson (1977, pp. 126-127) reasoned that the null hypothesis would not be of
suﬃcient interest for statistical inference were it implausible, which is consistent with the
agent-based theory of the present paper. One way to determine which agent best represents
prior information is to require invariance to certain parameter and data transformations.
Helland (2004) proposed choosing between Π
(1)
x,0 and Π
(2)
x on the basis of transformation
properties; see Remark 3. Similarly, from a subjective Bayesian viewpoint, whether the
uniform prior is appropriate depends on an agent's beliefs (Berger, 1985, 4.7.9).
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5 Discussion
While the general theory of Section 2 is built on elements of frequentist and Bayesian rea-
soning, it leads to distinctive results that can be derived from neither frequentist theory
nor Bayesian theory alone. Speciﬁcally, ordering levels of belief according to conﬁdence
levels of nested conﬁdence intervals in a framework of maximum expected utility leads to
ﬁducial distributions that are not necessarily conﬁdence distributions or Bayesian posterior
distributions.
A striking implication of this ﬁducial approach is the interpretation of the p-value as the
level of agent belief in the null hypothesis (2.1.2, 3.1). Given the conditions of Lemma 1
and Corollary 1, the certainty level of a simple null hypothesis is distributed as a p-value
under the null hypothesis: CX (ϑ = θ0) ∼ U (0, 1). That sharply conﬂicts with the behavior
of the Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis, which converges to 1 under the
null hypothesis under widely applicable conditions. Thus, while many ﬁducial distributions
are equal to certain objective Bayesian posterior distributions (Jeﬀreys, 1998, 7.4), the joint
ﬁducial distributions emphasized in Section 3 have no strict Bayesian counterpart.
The discrepancy between the p-value and Bayesian posterior probabilities of the null
hypothesis (Berger and Sellke, 1987) has been explained in terms of treating the simple
(sharp) null hypothesis as an approximation of a composite null hypothesis centered at the
parameter value of the null hypothesis (Gómez-Villegas and Sanz, 1998). From the point of
view of eﬀect-size estimation, the low probability of a simple null hypothesis is irrelevant if
the estimated eﬀect size is too small to be of any practical signiﬁcance. For that reason, the
impact of the proposed approach on point and interval estimation (3.2) is more relevant to
applications than the probability of the null hypothesis in itself.
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The tension between the ﬁducial probability and a Bayesian posterior probability of the
null hypothesis is also alleviated by recalling that the former is only appropriate inasmuch
as the physical distribution of the parameter is unknown. As epistemological distributions,
ﬁducial distributions must yield to Bayesian posteriors to the extent that physical priors
are known (Bickel, 2011a, 2012b,d). For example, if a physical prior is fully known, then
the Bayesian posterior completely replaces the ﬁducial distribution (Fisher, 1973; Wilkinson,
1977).
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Appendix A: Additional proofs
Proof of Theorem 2 The ordering speciﬁed by formulas (5) and (6) implies the existence
of a function ω : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that Cx (Θ1) = ω
(
sup
∣∣∣Θ̂−1x (Θ1)∣∣∣) for all x ∈ X and
Θ1 ∈ Hx
(
Θ̂
)
. By formulas (1) and (4),
Cx (Θ1) = Cx
(
px (ϑ) ∈ I (Θ1)
)
= ω
(∣∣I (Θ1)∣∣) , (26)
for all Θ1 ∈ Hx
(
Θ̂
)
, where I (Θ1) is the widest interval in Θ̂−1x (Θ1), and ϑ is the random
variable of distribution Cx. Therefore, since the conﬁdence procedure is potentially invertible,
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there is an x ∈ X and a Ix ⊆ I such that, given any  > 0 and δ ∈ ]0, 1[,
ω (|[α, α + δ]|) ≤ Cx (α ≤ px (ϑ) ≤ α + δ) ≤ ω (|[α, α + δ]|+ )
for all α ∈ [0, 1− δ]. Since  is arbitrarily small, the function ω must satisfy
Cx (α ≤ px (ϑ) ≤ α + δ) = ω (|[α, α + δ]|)
= ω (δ)
for all α ∈ [0, 1− δ]. Since ω (δ) (the right-hand side) does not depend on α and since
Cx (0 ≤ px (ϑ) ≤ 1) = 1, px (ϑ) is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 for all x ∈ X , and
ω (δ) = δ for all δ ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, by formula (26),
Cx (Θ1) =
∣∣I (Θ1)∣∣ = sup ∣∣∣Θ̂−1x (Θ1)∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣Θ̂−1x (Θ1)∣∣∣
for all Θ1 ∈ Hx
(
Θ̂
)
. In conclusion, Cx (Θ1) ≥ |I| for all I ∈ I such that Θ̂x (I) = Θ1.
Substitutions involving formulas (3) and (9) complete the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1 The ﬁrst claim follows immediately from Theorems 1 and 2. Since
every certainty distribution Cx is also a basic ﬁducial distribution, the deﬁnition of the latter
yields
Cx (ϑ = θ0) = Cx ([θ0, θ0]) ≥ Pθ,γ (pX (θ) ∈ [0, α])
for all α ∈ [0, 1] such that {θ ∈ Θ : px (θ) ∈ [0, α]} = [θ0, θ0]. Thus,
Cx (ϑ = θ0) = Pθ,γ (pX (θ) ≤ px (θ)) .
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Lemma 1 then gives formula (12).
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